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In categorical compositional semantics of natural language one studies functors from a category of
grammatical derivations (such as a Lambek pregroup) to a semantic category (such as real vector
spaces). We compositionally build game-theoretic semantics of sentences by taking the semantic
category to be the category whose morphisms are open games. This requires some modifications to
the grammar category to compensate for the failure of open games to form a compact closed category.
We illustrate the theory using simple examples of Wittgenstein’s language-games.
1 Introduction
A key component of language is that it is used by agents to communicate about the world they live in,
and that it forms part of a network of actions used to interact with the world. This notion was used by
Wittgenstein in his description of language games as a way of exploring how signs and symbols could
come to refer to objects in the world [23]. It has also been used in the artificial intelligence community as
a way of enabling artificial systems to develop their own meanings and to examine how those meanings
arise [21]. Relatedly, game theory has been applied to language research. [11] provides a review of how
game theory has been to formalise the idea of communication as a signalling game, to examine the notion
of relevance, and, using evolutionary game theory, to investigate how signals evolve to correspond to a
convex region of representational space.
Another approach to language is the field of computational linguistics, and in particular composi-
tional distributional semantics such as that presented in [6, 16]. This approach seeks to unify the rich
semantic representations that can be learnt from text corpora with the compositional and generative
power of formal semantics. However, it is agent-free. There is no sense of language being used by an
agent, of its relation to the world, or of its part in a network of actions. To use ideas from compositional
distributional semantics in a system interacting with the world, the theory must be developed further.
In this paper we begin to unify the categorical compositional distributional semantics of [6] with the
categorical approach to game theory introduced in [7, 9]. We use the category of open games [7] to
represent the semantics of words and phrases. However, the grammar used in [6] is not available to used,
since the category of open games is not compact closed. We therefore develop a novel grammar, similar
to Lambek’s protogroup grammar [13], and which is based on the free teleological category introduced
in [10]. Finally, we give an example based on one of Wittgenstein’s language games.
2 Background
2.1 Categorical Compositional Semantics
In the study of language at least two distinct camps can be identified. On one side, the way that words
compose to form phrases and sentences is the object of research. On the other, the meanings of the
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words themselves is seen as paramount. These two approaches can be labelled syntax and semantics
respectively. There is then also pragmatics, the aspect of how words, phrases and so on are actually
used in discourse, but we do not deal with this at present. The categorical compositional approach was
introduced in the context of distributional semantics by [6], and further elucidated in [3]. The approach
was outlined in [3] as follows:
1. (a) Choose a compositional structure, such as a pregroup, or other categorial grammar.
(b) Interpret this structure as a category, the grammar category.
2. (a) Choose or craft appropriate meaning or concept spaces, such as vector spaces.
(b) Organize these spaces into a category, the semantics category, with the same abstract struc-
ture as the grammar category.
3. Interpret the compositional structure of the grammar category in the semantics category via a
functor preserving the type reduction structure.
4. Bingo! This functor maps type reductions in the grammar category onto algorithms for composing
meanings in the semantics category.
In [6], the authors instantiated this approach in the context of compact closed categories using pregroup
grammar as the grammar category and FVect or Rel as the semantic category. [4] show how the grammar
category may be changed to Lambek categorial grammar. In [17, 1], the same approach was instantiated
using pregroup grammar and the category of completely positive maps on FVect, and [3] introduce a
category of convex algebras and convex relations as the semantics category.
The key concept in all of the above examples is that of a monoidal category. This is a category with
a parallel composition operation ⊗, which is associative, has a unit, and acts bifunctorially on objects
and morphisms. Monoidal categories have a convenient diagrammatic calculus, which we will make use
of in later sections. For details of this calculus, see for example [5].
Many of the examples work in the framework of compact closed categories. A compact closed
category is a monoidal category with left and right adjoints (−)l , (−)r on objects and the morphisms:
ε lA : A
l⊗A→ IA, ε
r
A : A⊗A
r → IA, η
l
A : IA → A⊗A
l, η rA : IA → A
r⊗A
termed counits and units respectively, which satisfy the snake equations
(1A⊗ ε
l)◦ (η l⊗1A) = 1A (ε
r⊗1A)◦ (1A⊗η
r) = 1A
(ε l⊗1Al)◦ (1Al ⊗η
l) = 1Al (1Ar ⊗ ε
r)◦ (η r⊗1Ar) = 1Ar
In compact closed categories, the diagrammatic calculus is enhanced by the fact that we can bend wires.
In our linguistic examples, we frequently use the notion of a pregroup grammar. A pregroup grammar
is built from the free compact closed category over a set of basic types. Consider the set {n,s} of types
corresponding to nouns and declarative sentences. The tensor product is denoted by concatenation,
allowing us to build composite types. For example, the type of a transitive verb is nrsnl . A string of types
is judged grammatical if it reduces to the type s under application of the unit and counit morphisms. So,
the sentence Gamblers take chances is typed: n nrsnl n and reduces as follows:
n nrsnl n
ε rn 1s ε
l
n−−−−→ snl n
1s ε
l
n−−→ s
More precisely, a pregroup grammar is a triple G= (L ,T,s,D) where:
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• L is the lexicon, a set of words
• T is a set of basic types
• s ∈ T is the distinguished sentence type
• D ⊆L ×PT is the dictionary, where PT is (the set of elements of) the free pregroup on T .
We model the grammar in the category FVect of finite dimensional vector spaces. We must choose a
finite-dimensional vector space [[t]] for every t ∈ T . This induces a monoidal functor [[−]] : CT → FVect,
where CT is the free compact closed category with generating objects T , by specifying that [[t
l]] = [[tr]] =
[[t]]∗ (where −∗ denotes the dual vector space), and [[t1t2]] = [[t1]]⊗ [[t2]]. (Note the careful distinction
between PT and CT , to avoid the argument in [18] that monoidal functors out of PT are necessarily
trivial.) We must also specify a word-vector [[w]] ∈ [[t]] for each word w ∈L with (w, t) ∈D ; in practice
these vectors will be computed from corpora of text by statistical or machine learning methods. Now
given a sentence w1 . . .wn, we compute its semantic vector [[w1 . . .wn]] ∈ [[s]] by the following steps:
1. Choose a type (wi, ti) ∈D for each word (this is automatic if each word in L is assigned a unique
type by D)
2. Choose a morphism f : t1 · · · tn → s in CT , which represents a grammatical parsing of the sentence
3. Apply the linear map [[ f ]] : [[t1]]⊗·· ·⊗ [[tn]]→ [[s]] to the bag-of-words vector [[w1]]⊗·· ·⊗ [[wn]]
In the current paper, we instantiate the approach with the category OG of open games as the se-
mantics category rather than FVect. This allows us to express commands and subsequent actions, and
is therefore a richer setting than previously, in which there was no concept of agent, nor of action. The
category of open games, however, is not compact closed. In particular it has counits, but no units. We
therefore use the notion of a protogroup [13] as the basis for our grammar category.
2.2 Language Games
The approach to language outlined in [6] is focussed on solving a particular problem in computational
linguistics. However, language in general is used by agents, in the world, and together with other actions.
This attitude to language was outlined in [23]. Meanings of words arise from the situations in which they
are used. The term language game is used to talk about small fragments of language that can be used to
highlight how language obtains its meaning.
This approach to language has been used as a way of bootstrapping language learning in artificial
intelligence approaches. These are summarised in [21]. In brief, rather than attempt to specify represen-
tations of concepts for AI systems, these systems are given the ability to form their own representations,
based on their interactions with the world and with other systems (including humans). The Talking
Heads experiment [20] was designed to show how a population of interacting agents could develop a
shared lexicon, together with perceptually grounded categorizations corresponding to items of the lexi-
con. The game is played as follows. Both the speaker and the hearer can see the same set of shapes. The
speaker chooses a shape, and says some words corresponding to that shape. Then, the hearer must point
out which shape it guesses. If the hearer gets the shape wrong, the speaker indicates which shape is the
correct one. This game is played a number of times, with each agent playing both the role of the speaker
and the hearer in different rounds. As the game is played, representations are built up and altered, and
the sets of words and concepts of the agents become coordinated, without central control or telepathy.
The language game we will outline in the current paper is based on Wittgenstein’s builder and assis-
tant game. This will be given in more detail in section 5. Briefly, the game runs as follows:
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The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant
B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to
pass the stones, in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language
consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the
stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. Conceive this as a complete
primitive language. [23, §2]
In contrast to the Talking Heads game, the game here is not played iteratively. The assistant B has
already learnt what each word means. We write down how the language game can be formalized game-
theoretically, and give an extension of it, in which imperative verbs are introduced.
2.3 Open games
A game, informally speaking, is a model of (any number of) interacting agents, in which each individual
agent acts rationally or strategically in order to optimise some outcome that is personal to them. The
notion of Nash equilibrium is used to describe an assignment of behaviours to each agent which are
mutually rational, that is, each is rational under the assumption that the others are fixed.
An open game is a piece of a game, which can be composed together to build ordinary games [9, 7].
There is a symmetric monoidal category OG whose morphisms are (equivalence classes of) open games,
in which the categorical composition and monoidal product are respectively sequential and simultaneous
play of open games.
The objects of the categoryOG are pairs of sets
(
X
S
)
, which represent sets of ordinary forward-flowing
information, and ‘counterfactual’ information that appears to flow backwards.
Definition 1. Let X ,S,Y,R be sets. An open game G :
(
X
S
)
→
(
Y
R
)
is a 4-tuple (ΣG ,PG ,CG ,EG ) where:
• ΣG is a set, the set of strategy profiles (roughly, possible behaviours of G unconstrained by ratio-
nality)
• PG : ΣG ×X → Y is the play function, which runs a strategy profile on an observation to produce
a choice
• CG : ΣG ×X×R→ S is the coplay function, which propagates payoffs further backwards in time
• EG : X× (Y → R)→P(ΣG ) is the equilibrium function, which gives a subset of EG (h,k)⊆ ΣG of
strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria for each context (h,k). The context consists of a history
h : X (which says what happened in the past) and a continuation k : Y → R (which says what will
happen in the future given the present).
The string diagram language for OG has directed strings, where a pair
(
X
S
)
is represented by an X -
labelled string directed forwards together with an S-labelled string directed backwards. A general open
game G :
(
X
S
)
→
(
Y
R
)
is represented by a string diagram of the form
X
S
Y
R
G
A closed game is a scalar G : I → I in OG, where I =
(
1
1
)
is the monoidal unit. A closed game G is
determined by a set ΣG of strategy profiles and a subset EG ⊆ ΣG of Nash equilibria.
As an example, consider a single decision made by an agent who observes an element of X before
choosing an element of Y , in order to maximise a real number. This situation is represented by the open
game A : (X ,1)→ (Y,R) defined by the following data:
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• The set of strategy profiles is ΣA = X →Y
• The play function is PA (σ ,x) = σ(x)
• The coplay function has codomain 1, hence is trivial
• The equilibrium function is EA (h,k) = {σ : X →Y | σ(h) ∈ argmaxk}
We represent A by the string diagram
X
Y
R
A
We do not have space to define the entire categorical structure of OG, instead referring the reader to
[7, 9], but we define categorical composition as an illustration. Let G :
(
X
S
)
→
(
Y
R
)
and H :
(
Y
R
)
→
(
Z
Q
)
be open games. The composite open game H ◦G :
(
X
S
)
→
(
Z
Q
)
is defined as follows:
• The set of strategy profiles is ΣH ◦G = ΣG ×ΣH
• The play function is PH ◦G ((σ ,τ),x) = PH (τ ,PG (σ ,x))
• The coplay function is CH ◦G ((σ ,τ),x,q) = CG (σ ,x,CH (τ ,PG (σ ,x),q))
• The equilibrium function is
EH ◦G (h,k) = {(σ ,τ) | σ ∈ EG (h,kτ ) and τ ∈ EH (PG (σ ,h),k)}
where kτ :Y → R is given by kτ (y) = CH (τ ,y,k(PH (τ ,y))).
A zero-player open game is an open game G is one which has exactly one strategy profile, which is
an equilibrium for every context.
OG is not a compact closed category, but it does have a ‘partial duality’ which can be defined on
objects by
(
X
S
)∗
=
(
S
X
)
. For every X there is a canonical (zero-player) open game εX :
(
X
X
)
→ I, but there
is no canonical dual I→
(
X
X
)
. We denote εX by the string diagram
X
X
Given a set X , we write X for
(
X
1
)
and X for
(
1
X
)
. A function f : X →Y has both covariant and contravari-
ant liftings as zero-player open games, which we call f : X → Y and f : Y → X , which are dual in this
sense; but no other open game has a dual. The former has play function P f (∗,x) = f (x), and the latter
has coplay function C f (∗,∗,x) = f (x). We denote these by
X Yf XY f
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2.4 Open games by example
The easiest way to show the expressive power of open games is by examples of closed games G : I→ I,
which are represented by string diagrams with no open strings passing the left or right boundaries.
Given agents Ai : I→
(
Xi
R
)
as defined above (where Ai is a decision of an agent making an observation
from 1 = {∗} and a choice from Xi), the n-fold monoidal product
n⊗
i=1
Ai : I →
(
∏ni=1Xi
R
n
)
represents
a game in which n player make choices simultaneously. The set of strategy profiles of this game is
Σ⊗n
i=1Ai
= ∏ni=1Xi and, given a payoff function k : ∏
n
i=1Xi →R
n, the equilibrium set E⊗n
i=1Ai
(∗,k) is the
set of Nash equilibria of the n-player game with payoff function k, namely
E⊗n
i=1Ai
(∗,k) =
{
σ :
n
∏
i=1
Xi
∣∣∣∣∣ k(σ)i ≥ k(σ [i 7→ xi])i for all 1≤ i≤ n and xi : Xi
}
We can extend this to a closed game by fixing some particular k, by lifting k as a function and
combining it with ε . For example, suppose we restrict to n = 2 and pick some payoff function k :
X ×Y → R2. This is the class of ‘bimatrix games’ and contains many famous examples such as the
prisoner’s dilemma and chicken, depending on the choice of X , Y and k.
The 2-player closed game with payoff function k is represented by the string diagram
A1
A2
k
X
Y
R
R
R
R
Recall that a closed game is defined by a set of strategy profiles and a subset of Nash equilibria. The
closed game G : I→ I defined by this string diagram has strategy profiles ΣG =X×Y , and Nash equilibria
EG = {(x,y) : X×Y | k(x,y)1 ≥ k(x
′,y)1 for all x
′ : X , and k(x,y)2 ≥ k(x,y
′)2 for all y
′ :Y}
Next, given a decision A :
(
X
1
)
→
(
Y
R
)
that observes an X and chooses a Y , we form the composite
A ∆ :
(
X
1
)
→
(
X×Y
R
)
defined by the string diagram
X
Y
R
X
A
where the node denotes the lifting of the copying function ∆ : X → X ×X . This important gadget has set
of strategy profiles ΣA ∆ = X →Y , play function PA ∆(σ ,x) = (x,σ(x)) and equilibrium function
EA ∆(h,k) = {σ : X →Y | σ(h) ∈ argmaxk(h,−)}
J. Hedges & M. Lewis 95
Using this gadget we can build sequential games. For example, a 2-player sequential game in which
the first player chooses from X , the second player observes this perfectly before choosing aY , and payoffs
being given by k : X×Y →R2 can be built from the decision A1 : I→
(
X
R
)
and A2 :
(
X
1
)
→
(
Y
R
)
using the
string diagram
A1 A2
k
X
X
X
Y
R
R
R
R
Similarly, if the second player cannot perfectly observe the first move x but only its image under
some function f : X → Z, we can model this using the string diagram obtained from the previous one
by inserting an f -labelled node between the copying node and A2 :
(
Z
1
)
→
(
Y
R
)
. As a typical example
we impose an equivalence relation ∼ on X , and let f : X → X/ ∼ be the projection onto the quotient.
Such equivalence classes are known as ‘information sets’ in game theory. If f : X → 1 then we recover
a simultaneous game, since deleting is the counit for the black comonoid.
Note that each of the previous examples readily generalises to games of n players.
3 Process grammar
We analyse the methodology of categorical compositional distributional semantics, arguing that we need
to modify the concept of a pregroup grammar in order to compensate for the semantic category lacking
a compact closed structure. Specifically, we argue that pregroup grammars rely on the semantic category
satisfying state-process duality, a feature not present in the category of open games. While the gram-
matical parsing of sentences using a pregroup grammar relies only on the counits xlx ≤ 1, xxr ≤ 1 of a
pregroup’s compact closed structure [13, corollary 1], state-process duality in the semantic category re-
lies on the units I→ X⊗X∗. In order to capture this Lambek defines protogroups similarly to pregroups,
but having only counits.
Consider the typing of a noun phrase consisting of an adjective and a noun, such as large slabs.
Typically, we have a primitive type of noun phrases n ∈ T , and the dictionary D contains the entries
(slabs,n) and (large,nnl). We have a semantic functor [[−]] : CT → FVect, whose definition includes a
choice of vector space N = [[n]], the noun space. By functorality, the type nnl of large is sent to the tensor
product N⊗N∗. However, we might imagine that the the semantics of an adjective is fundamentally a
(linear) function, where for example the semantics of large is a function that takes the semantics of a
noun phrase x to the semantics of the noun phrase large x. The unit ηN : I → N⊗N
∗ in FVect (where
I = R) is what allows us to encode a linear map f : N → N as a vector f ∈ N⊗N∗, such that function
application f (v) can be recovered (after encoding vectors in V as linear maps I → V ) via the counit
εN : N
∗⊗N→ I
I ∼= I⊗ I
f⊗v
−−→ (N⊗N∗)⊗N ∼= N⊗ (N∗⊗N)
N⊗εN−−−→ N⊗ I ∼= N
This entire methodology fails when we replace FVect with a different semantic category, such as
OG, which does not have state-process duality. (OG is additionally not monoidal closed, which also
rules out using a Lambek calculus.) In this section we develop an alternative.
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Notice that the following sets are equal: (1) Elements of the free pregroup on T ; (2) Objects of the
strict free compact closed category with generating objects T ; (3) Elements of the free protogroup on
T ; (4) Objects of the free strict teleological category with generating objects T . See [13, 19, 12, 10] for
various characterisations of these free structures. A ‘teleological category’ is a category whose abstract
structure is similar to OG, in particular having counits but no units; posetal teleological categories are
protogroups.
Definition 2. A process grammar is a triple G= (L ,T,s,D) where
• L is the lexicon, i.e. the set of words
• T is the set of primitive types
• s ∈ PT is the sentence type, where PT is (the set of elements of) the free pregroup on T
• The dictionary D is a subset D ⊆L ×PT ×PT
The difference between this definition and the standard definition of a pregroup grammar (see section
2.1) is that words are associated to pairs of types, rather than single types. Given a dictionary entry
(w, t) ∈ D in a pregroup grammar, we view the semantics [[w]] as a state I → [[t]]. Given a dictionary
entry (w, t, t ′) ∈D in a process grammar, we view the semantics [[w]] as a process [[t]]→ [[t ′]]. It was not
necessary in the pregroup grammar to reprent the semantics [[w]] as a process, since in a compact closed
category a morphism A→ B can always be represented as a morphism I → B⊗A∗, and hence we only
need keep track of one object. In contrast, in a process grammar we need both objects A and B. We
consider every pregroup grammar (L ,T,s,D) as a process grammar (L ,T,s,D ′) using the dictionary
D ′ = {(w,1, t) | (w, t) ∈D}.
Definition 3. Let G= (L ,T,s,D) be a process grammar. We write CG for the free teleological category
with
• The set of generating objects is T
• The set of generating morphisms1 is {wt,t ′ : t → t
′ | (w, t, t ′) ∈D}
The free teleological category is characterised in [10] as a category whose morphisms are equivalence
classes of suitable string diagrams.
With a pregroup grammar G= (L ,T,s,D), parsing a sentence w1 . . .wn is a 2-stage process:
1. Choose dictionary entries (wi, ti) ∈D
2. Choose a morphism t1 · · · tn → s in CT , where CT is the free compact closed category with gener-
ating objects T
With a process grammar G , these two stages become conflated: a choice of morphism 1 → s in CG
contains both a choice of type for each word, and a reduction to the sentence type, since the types of each
word represent the processes that comprise the reduction. This method of parsing is also considered in
[22], where its equivalence to the previously described method is proved.
There is a problem with this: the sentence has disappeared! Out of all of the morphisms 1→ s in
CG, how do we recognise those which are parsings of a particular sentence w1 . . .wn? We must identify
the morphisms 1→ s that corresponds to the sentence we actually want to parse. A solution to this is to
present the free teleological category CG using a sequent calculus, which can be done in a standard way
by identifying suitable proofs [2, 15], where the categorical composition is cutting proofs together.
1Formally, a teleological category distinguishes ‘dualisable morphisms’ and ‘non-dualisable morphisms’. For simplicity,
we consider all generators of CG to be non-dualisable.
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Specifically, consider a noncommutative linear calculus whose judgements are ϕ ⊢ ψ for ϕ ,ψ ∈ PT .
For each t ∈ T we have three identity axioms:
(l-id)
t l ⊢ t l
(id)
t ⊢ t
(r-id)
tr ⊢ tr
For each (w,ϕ ,ψ) ∈D we have an axiom
(wϕ ,ψ)
ϕ ⊢ ψ
Only two of the four axioms for negation are present, reflecting that our grammar corresponds to pro-
togroups rather than pregroups:
(l-intro)
ϕ ⊢ tψ
t lϕ ⊢ ψ
(r-intro)
ϕ ⊢ ψt
ϕtr ⊢ ψ
Finally, we have the cut and ⊗-introduction rules:
(cut)
ϕ ⊢ ψ ψ ⊢ χ
ϕ ⊢ χ
(⊗-intro)
ϕ ⊢ ψ ϕ ′ ⊢ ψ ′
ϕϕ ′ ⊢ ψψ ′
With this setup, we can define a parsing of the sentence w1 . . .wn to be a derivation of ⊢ s such that, if
we read the non-identity axioms used in the derivation from left to right, they are labelled by the wi in the
correct order. Derivations then witness morphisms in CG, and so we can define the sentence semantics
by applying a semantic functor directly to the derivation.
As an example, suppose L contains the words bring large slabs, T contains n and s, and D contains
the entries (bring,1,snl), (large,nl ,nl) and (slabs,1,n). Here is an example of a derivation of the sentence
bring large slabs:
(bring)
⊢ snl
(id)
s ⊢ s
(large)
nl ⊢ nl
(slabs)
⊢ n
(l-intro)
nl ⊢
(cut)
nl ⊢
(⊗-intro)
snl ⊢ s
(cut)
⊢ s
Note that the restriction to the free teleological category does not restrict the sentences which are
grammatical: Lambek’s switching lemma [14] states that a sequence of epsilon and identity maps suffice
for the representation of the grammatical structure of any sentence in a pregroup grammar, and hence the
grammatical structure of any sentence in a pregroup grammar may also be represented in the teleological
grammar.
4 Language-games as functors
Given the pieces we have set up, with the power of category theory our model can be stated very simply:
We study functors from a protogroup (or more precisely, a free teleological category) to the category of
open games. More precisely, we require that this functor preserves all of the structure of the protogroup,
so it should be a monoidal functor and also respect duals. Functors with the required properties were
named teleological functors in [10], although we again need to generalise to the non-symmetric case.
Definition 4. Let G = (L ,T,s,D) be a process grammar. A functorial language-game [[−]] on G is
determined by the following data:
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• For each type t ∈ T , a pair of sets [[t]]
• For each dictionary entry (w, t1, t2) ∈D , a choice of open game [[(w, t1, t2)]] : [[t1]]→ [[t2]]
Here [[ti]] is the object of OG (pair of sets) computed functorially in the evident way: [[tt
′]] = [[t1]]⊗ [[t2]]
(componentwise cartesian product), and [[t l ]] = [[tr]] = [[t]]∗ (swapping the pair).
A functorial language-game [[−]] on G induces a functor [[−]] : CG → OG in an evident way, since
the data specifies its action on the generators of CG. In particular we take [[εt ]] = ε[[t]].
A functorial language-game associates a game to every sentence generated by a process grammar, in
which the structure of the information flow in the game exactly reflects the grammatical structure of the
sentence. In practice this is a very strong restriction, and it is unclear whether it is actually desirable; in
this paper we are demonstrating that it is in principle possible, at least in simple cases.
In particular, consider a sentence of the form w1 . . .wi . . .w j . . .wn, in particular with wi appearing be-
fore w j in the list of words. In the resulting open game, the part corresponding to wi happens temporally
before the part corresponding to w j. Depending on the types, players in w j might or might not be able
to observe the result of wi; but there is no possible way for players in wi to observe w j. This is awkward,
and is also very sensitive to word order in the language we are modelling (English in our case).
For example, in the next section we will model sentences such as bring slabs, where bring contains
an agent who utters the order with a strategic preference for slabs to be brought. However, the agent
representing bring is unable to observe slabs! Instead, we will define slabs as a zero-player open game,
which means that the agent in bring is able to perfectly anticipate it. This is a subtle distinction, related
to the strange categorical structure ofOG, but one simple consequence is that the agent’s strategy cannot
be a function that chooses an order for every possible noun phrase.
5 Example
We will build an example based on [23]’s example of the master builder and apprentice. Consider a
universe that contains slabs and planks, both in two sizes, small and large. The master can order the
apprentice either to bring an object, or to cut it.
We build a simple categorial grammar to describe the master’s commands. (Imperative) sentences in
this grammar will be interpreted as open games containing a single player, representing the master, who
makes a move representing the order and receives utility if the appropriate action is carried out. This
open game can be closed by composing it with a second player, the apprentice. We can study the Nash
equilibria of the resulting game.
We define a process grammar G= (L ,T,s,D) as follows. Let L = {slabs,planks, large,bring,cut}.
Let T = {n,s} where n is the basic type of noun phrases and s is the basic type of imperative sentences.
The dictionary is given by
slabs : 1≤ n planks : 1≤ n large : nl ≤ nl
bring : 1≤ snl cut : 1≤ snl
where w : x≤ y means (w,x,y) ∈D .
We interpret the nouns and adjectives as zero-player open games lifted from a simple Montague-like
semantics. LetU be a semantic universe, with chosen subsets S,P,L⊆U of objects that are slabs, planks,
and large things. We begin building a semantic functor [[−]] : CG →OG.
We firstly interpret [[n]] =P(U). The nouns slabs and planks are interpreted as the zero-player open
games containing the constant function returning the subsets of S and P respectively. So [[slabs]] : I →
P(U) is the zero-player open game with play function P[[slabs]](∗,∗) = S, and similarly for planks.
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Consider the function ∩L : P(U)→ P(U) given by X 7→ X ∩L, i.e. it takes a set of things to the
subset of those things which are large. Large has the grammatical process-type nl ≤ nl , so [[large]] must
be an open game P(U)→P(U). We define [[large]] = ∩L.
We model an imperative verb as a player (representing the master) choosing from a choice of actions,
which we think of as utterances in some language. This language could be defined to be the same
language defined by the categorial grammar we are considering, but in general it need not be. Let O be
a set of possible utterances (orders) in this language, which we assume nothing about; defining O to be
the set of well-typed sentences of G is one possible example.
We need to define a preference structure for the master. He receives two outcomes: the first, which
will be a constant, represents the set of objects referred to by the subsequent noun phrase. The second
represents the action done by the apprentice. If the verb in question is bring then the outcome (S,a)
is preferred, where S ⊆U and a is an action, precisely when a represents bringing some element of S.
Similarly if the verb is cut then (S,a) is preferred when a represents cutting some element of S.
Let A= {B(x) | x∈U}∪{C(x) | x∈U} be the set of possible actions, where B(x) represents bringing
x andC(x) represents cutting it. We define the sentence space to be [[s]] =
(
O
A
)
. This means that a sentence
with derivation 1 → s is represented as an open game I →
(
O
A
)
which chooses an element of O with
outcomes in A.
The verb bring has grammatical process type 1 ≤ snl , which means its semantics must be an open
game with type [[bring]] : I→
(
O
A
)
⊗P(U) =
(
O
A×P(U)
)
. We define it as the following open game:
• The set of strategy profiles is Σ[[bring]] = O
• The play function P[[bring]] : Σ[[bring]]×1→ O is given by P[[bring]](o,∗) = o
• The coplay function C[[bring]] : Σ[[bring]]×1×A×P(U)→ 1 is given by C[[bring]](o,∗,a,S) = ∗
• The equilibrium function E[[bring]] : 1× (O→ A×P(U))→P(Σ[[bring]]) is given by
E[[bring]](∗,k) = {o | k(o)1 = B(x) for some x ∈ k(o)2}
The open game [[cut]] : I→
(
O
A×P(U)
)
is defined in the same way, except that B(x) is changed to C(x).
Consider the sentence bring large slabs, with the derivation 1 ≤ s given at the end of section 3. Ap-
plying the functor [[−]] produces the open game [[bring large slabs]] : I→
(
O
A
)
represented by the diagram:
[[bring]]
[[large]]
[[slabs]]
O
A
P(U)
P(U)P(U)
Explicitly, this open game is given by the following data, which can be computed compositionally given
the operations on OG:
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• The set of strategy profiles is Σ[[bring large slabs]] =O
• The play function is P[[bring large slabs]](o,∗) = o
• The equilibrium function, which takes a parameter k : O→ A, is
E[[bring large slabs]](k) = {o : O | k(o) = B(x) for some x ∈ S∩L}
In other words, given a continuation k : O→ A that converts orders into actions (which abstracts over
the behaviour of an as-yet-unspecified apprentice), the good orders from the master’s perspective are the
ones that the continuation will convert into the action of bringing some slab. It should be noted that this
open game contains no built-in relationship between the orders O and actions A, but rather takes this as
a parameter through k; that is to say, our model of the master has not fixed a semantics of orders.
This open game defines the master’s half of the situation, abstracting out everything else into the con-
tinuation k. In order to produce a genuine game we must compose with another open game representing
the decision made by the apprentice. In our setup this is an extra post-processing step, and has not been
produced functorially from the sentence’s grammar.
In order to make the apprentice into a game-theoretic agent, we must consider what his objectives
are. In Wittgenstein’s example the master utters the words “Bring large slabs”, and then the apprentice
brings slabs; but even assuming the agent understands the master’s language, why should he follow the
order? In order to model the situation game-theoretically, we must define the apprentice’s objectives
such that following the order becomes rational.
For now we will take a simple option: The apprentice has a built-in translation from O to A, and
has a preference to carry out the received order according to this endogenous language, in line with the
Wittgenstein quote in section 2.2.
Fix a function f : O×A→ R, which is the apprentice’s judgement of the similarity between orders
and outcomes. We define the apprentice as an agent who, on receiving the order o : O, will choose some
a : A in order to maximise the similarity f (o,a). Let G :
(
O
A
)
→ I be the open game defined by the diagram
O
A
argmax
f
O
A
A
R
O
Concretely, it is given by the following data:
• The set of strategy profiles is ΣG = O→ A
• The coplay function CG : ΣG ×O×1→ A is CG (σ ,o,∗) = σ(o)
• The equilibrium function EG : O→P(ΣG ) is
EG (o) = {σ | σ(o) ∈ argmax
a:A
f (o,a)}
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The final step is to form the composition G ◦ [[bring large slabs]] : I → I, a closed game. In a Nash
equilibrium of the composite, the master uses the apprentice’s built-in language in order to choose an
order. Concretely, the data specifying this game is:
• The set of strategy profiles is ΣG ◦[[bring large slabs]] = O× (O→ A)
• The Nash equilibria, which are now simply a subset of ΣG ◦[[bring large slabs]], are
{(o,σ) | σ(o) = B(x) for some x ∈ S∩L and σ(o) ∈ argmax
a:A
f (o,a)}
Since this is a sequential game we can compute equilibria by a method known as backward induction,
which also reveals the way that the agents themselves might reason. Although o 7→ argmaxa:A f (o,a) is
a multi-valued function, each possible choice defines an optimal strategy σ : O→ A for the apprentice.
These σ are the ways that the master can deduce the apprentice might behave, given the apprentice’s
understanding of the language. It may also be reasonable to assume that f specifies the language unam-
biguously in the sense that each argmaxa:A f (o,a) is unique, in which case σ is uniquely defined.
A choice of σ completely describes the apprentice’s expected behaviour, so now we can reason as
the master. He would like to choose some order o ∈ O such that σ(o) is one of the actions that he will
be satisfied with. In this case, the set of good actions is B[S∩L] (the forward image of S∩L under B), so
the set of good orders given σ is σ−1[B[S∩L]].
6 Outlook
The theory as developed so far describes a simple signalling game, but allows for compositional aspects
of language to be included. Future work will introduce consequences for the apprentice, thereby enabling
the master and apprentice to coordinate on a choice of language. There are several possibilities here. A
nice idea is that there are economic consequences for the apprentice, such as being fired or having his
pay docked. A more linguistic angle is that the master verbally thanks or scolds the apprentice depending
on the action, and the apprentice has preferences over these utterances. Both of these have the attractive
feature that the master and apprentice do not automatically share a language (precisely, a relationship
between orders O and actions A), but in each Nash equilibrium they successfully coordinate on a choice
of language. Both of these require extending the game with further stages in the future, where the master
moves again after the apprentice, possibly in an infinitely repeated game [8]. Doing this functorially
will require more extensive changes to the grammar, so we leave it for future work. Game theoretic
approaches to linguistics show that convex concepts emerge from agents’ interactions: using a more
structured meaning space would allow us to investigate this.
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